Files
netbird/client/server/ssh_gate_test.go

349 lines
11 KiB
Go

package server
import (
"context"
"net/url"
"os"
"runtime"
"strings"
"testing"
"google.golang.org/genproto/googleapis/rpc/errdetails"
"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials"
"google.golang.org/grpc/peer"
gstatus "google.golang.org/grpc/status"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/ipcauth"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
)
// ctxWithIdentity builds a request context carrying the identity the transport
// credentials would have attached.
func ctxWithIdentity(id ipcauth.Identity) context.Context {
return peer.NewContext(context.Background(), &peer.Peer{
AuthInfo: ipcauth.AuthInfo{
CommonAuthInfo: credentials.CommonAuthInfo{SecurityLevel: credentials.NoSecurity},
Identity: id,
},
})
}
// unprivUID is deliberately not this process's own uid. An unprivileged daemon
// treats a caller sharing its identity as privileged (rootless containers), and
// the test binary would otherwise stand in for both the daemon and the caller.
// os.Geteuid returns -1 on Windows, where identities are SIDs instead and this is
// unused.
var unprivUID = uint32(os.Geteuid() + 1)
// The fabricated identities have to be shaped like the platform's: a uid says
// nothing on Windows, and a zero uid there would read as root and be privileged.
func rootCtx() context.Context { return ctxWithIdentity(privilegedIdentity()) }
func userCtx() context.Context { return ctxWithIdentity(unprivilegedIdentity()) }
func privilegedIdentity() ipcauth.Identity {
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
// LocalSystem, which is what the Windows service account is.
return ipcauth.Identity{SID: "S-1-5-18"}
}
return ipcauth.Identity{UID: 0}
}
func unprivilegedIdentity() ipcauth.Identity {
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
// A plain user SID: no groups, so no BUILTIN\Administrators, and not
// elevated.
return ipcauth.Identity{SID: "S-1-5-21-1-2-3-1001"}
}
return ipcauth.Identity{UID: unprivUID, GID: unprivUID}
}
func noIdentityCtx() context.Context { return context.Background() }
func boolPtr(v bool) *bool { return &v }
func mustURL(t *testing.T, raw string) *url.URL {
t.Helper()
u, err := url.Parse(raw)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parse %q: %v", raw, err)
}
return u
}
func assertDenied(t *testing.T, err error) {
t.Helper()
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected the change to be refused, got nil")
}
st := gstatus.Convert(err)
if st.Code() != codes.PermissionDenied {
t.Fatalf("code = %v, want PermissionDenied", st.Code())
}
// The refusal must be machine-readable: the CLI and the UI render the
// summary and command from the detail rather than parsing the message.
var info *errdetails.ErrorInfo
for _, d := range st.Details() {
if got, ok := d.(*errdetails.ErrorInfo); ok {
info = got
}
}
if info == nil {
t.Fatal("refusal carries no ErrorInfo detail")
}
if info.GetReason() != ipcauth.ErrorReasonPrivilegeRequired || info.GetDomain() != ipcauth.ErrorDomain {
t.Fatalf("detail = %s/%s, want %s/%s", info.GetDomain(), info.GetReason(), ipcauth.ErrorDomain, ipcauth.ErrorReasonPrivilegeRequired)
}
if info.GetMetadata()[ipcauth.ErrorMetaSummary] == "" {
t.Error("detail carries no summary")
}
if info.GetMetadata()[ipcauth.ErrorMetaCommand] == "" {
t.Error("detail carries no command")
}
}
func assertAllowed(t *testing.T, err error) {
t.Helper()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected the change to be allowed, got %v", err)
}
}
func TestRequirePrivilegeForConfigChange_SSHFlags(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
stored *profilemanager.Config
change privilegedConfigChange
privileged bool
wantDeny bool
}{
{
name: "enabling the ssh server unprivileged is refused",
stored: &profilemanager.Config{ServerSSHAllowed: boolPtr(false)},
change: privilegedConfigChange{serverSSHAllowed: boolPtr(true)},
wantDeny: true,
},
{
name: "enabling the ssh server as root is allowed",
stored: &profilemanager.Config{ServerSSHAllowed: boolPtr(false)},
change: privilegedConfigChange{serverSSHAllowed: boolPtr(true)},
privileged: true,
},
{
name: "restating an already enabled ssh server is not a change",
stored: &profilemanager.Config{ServerSSHAllowed: boolPtr(true)},
change: privilegedConfigChange{serverSSHAllowed: boolPtr(true)},
},
{
name: "turning the ssh server off is not guarded",
stored: &profilemanager.Config{ServerSSHAllowed: boolPtr(true)},
change: privilegedConfigChange{serverSSHAllowed: boolPtr(false)},
},
{
name: "a profile with no config yet counts as off, so enabling is refused",
stored: nil,
change: privilegedConfigChange{serverSSHAllowed: boolPtr(true)},
wantDeny: true,
},
{
name: "enabling ssh root login unprivileged is refused",
stored: &profilemanager.Config{EnableSSHRoot: boolPtr(false)},
change: privilegedConfigChange{enableSSHRoot: boolPtr(true)},
wantDeny: true,
},
{
name: "restating ssh root login is not a change",
stored: &profilemanager.Config{EnableSSHRoot: boolPtr(true)},
change: privilegedConfigChange{enableSSHRoot: boolPtr(true)},
},
{
name: "turning ssh root login off is not guarded",
stored: &profilemanager.Config{EnableSSHRoot: boolPtr(true)},
change: privilegedConfigChange{enableSSHRoot: boolPtr(false)},
},
{
name: "disabling ssh authentication unprivileged is refused",
stored: &profilemanager.Config{DisableSSHAuth: boolPtr(false)},
change: privilegedConfigChange{disableSSHAuth: boolPtr(true)},
wantDeny: true,
},
{
name: "re-enabling ssh authentication is not guarded",
stored: &profilemanager.Config{DisableSSHAuth: boolPtr(true)},
change: privilegedConfigChange{disableSSHAuth: boolPtr(false)},
},
{
name: "a request that touches none of the guarded fields is allowed",
stored: &profilemanager.Config{ServerSSHAllowed: boolPtr(false)},
change: privilegedConfigChange{},
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
ctx := userCtx()
if tt.privileged {
ctx = rootCtx()
}
err := requirePrivilegeForConfigChange(ctx, tt.stored, tt.change)
if tt.wantDeny {
assertDenied(t, err)
return
}
assertAllowed(t, err)
})
}
}
func TestRequirePrivilegeForConfigChange_ManagementURL(t *testing.T) {
sshOn := func(raw string) *profilemanager.Config {
return &profilemanager.Config{ServerSSHAllowed: boolPtr(true), ManagementURL: mustURL(t, raw)}
}
sshOff := func(raw string) *profilemanager.Config {
return &profilemanager.Config{ServerSSHAllowed: boolPtr(false), ManagementURL: mustURL(t, raw)}
}
tests := []struct {
name string
stored *profilemanager.Config
requested string
privileged bool
wantDeny bool
}{
{
name: "moving the binding while ssh is enabled is refused",
stored: sshOn("https://api.netbird.io:443"),
requested: "https://attacker.example.com:443",
wantDeny: true,
},
{
name: "moving the binding as root is allowed",
stored: sshOn("https://api.netbird.io:443"),
requested: "https://selfhosted.example.com:443",
privileged: true,
},
{
name: "the same url restated is not a change",
stored: sshOn("https://api.netbird.io:443"),
requested: "https://api.netbird.io:443",
},
{
name: "an equivalent spelling of the same url is not a change",
stored: sshOn("https://api.netbird.io:443"),
requested: "https://api.netbird.io",
},
{
name: "an equivalent spelling with an explicit http port is not a change",
stored: sshOn("http://mgmt.internal:80"),
requested: "http://mgmt.internal",
},
{
name: "a different port on the same host is a change",
stored: sshOn("https://api.netbird.io:443"),
requested: "https://api.netbird.io:8443",
wantDeny: true,
},
{
name: "a different scheme on the same host is a change",
stored: sshOn("https://mgmt.internal:443"),
requested: "http://mgmt.internal:443",
wantDeny: true,
},
{
name: "with ssh disabled the binding is not guarded at all",
stored: sshOff("https://api.netbird.io:443"),
requested: "https://attacker.example.com:443",
},
{
name: "an unparseable url fails closed",
stored: sshOn("https://api.netbird.io:443"),
requested: "ht tp://%zz",
wantDeny: true,
},
{
name: "an empty url leaves the binding alone",
stored: sshOn("https://api.netbird.io:443"),
requested: "",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
ctx := userCtx()
if tt.privileged {
ctx = rootCtx()
}
err := requirePrivilegeForConfigChange(ctx, tt.stored, privilegedConfigChange{managementURL: tt.requested})
if tt.wantDeny {
assertDenied(t, err)
return
}
assertAllowed(t, err)
})
}
}
// A caller the daemon cannot identify must be refused, not trusted: that is the
// state on a TCP daemon socket, where no peer credentials exist.
func TestRequirePrivilegeForConfigChange_UnidentifiedCallerIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
err := requirePrivilegeForConfigChange(noIdentityCtx(),
&profilemanager.Config{ServerSSHAllowed: boolPtr(false)},
privilegedConfigChange{serverSSHAllowed: boolPtr(true)})
assertDenied(t, err)
// The guidance must point at the socket rather than at sudo, since elevating
// would not help.
st := gstatus.Convert(err)
if !strings.Contains(st.Message(), "service install") {
t.Errorf("message %q does not tell the operator how to fix the socket", st.Message())
}
}
func TestRequirePrivilegeForDeregistration(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
cfg *profilemanager.Config
privileged bool
wantDeny bool
}{
{
name: "deregistering while ssh is enabled is refused",
cfg: &profilemanager.Config{ServerSSHAllowed: boolPtr(true)},
wantDeny: true,
},
{
name: "deregistering while ssh is enabled is allowed for root",
cfg: &profilemanager.Config{ServerSSHAllowed: boolPtr(true)},
privileged: true,
},
{
name: "deregistering with ssh disabled is not guarded",
cfg: &profilemanager.Config{ServerSSHAllowed: boolPtr(false)},
},
{
name: "deregistering a profile with no config is not guarded",
cfg: nil,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
ctx := userCtx()
if tt.privileged {
ctx = rootCtx()
}
err := requirePrivilegeForDeregistration(ctx, tt.cfg)
if tt.wantDeny {
assertDenied(t, err)
return
}
assertAllowed(t, err)
})
}
}
// privilegedTestCtx is the context a handler-level test should use when it is
// standing in for a root/administrator caller. Tests that drive the handlers
// directly have no transport credentials, and the privileged-change gate refuses
// a caller it cannot identify.
func privilegedTestCtx() context.Context { return rootCtx() }