Compare commits

...

2 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Bethuel Mmbaga
9d1a37c644 [management,client] Revert gRPC client secret removal (#5781)
* This reverts commit e5914e4e8b

Signed-off-by: bcmmbaga <bethuelmbaga12@gmail.com>

* Deprecate client secret in proto

Signed-off-by: bcmmbaga <bethuelmbaga12@gmail.com>

* Fix lint

Signed-off-by: bcmmbaga <bethuelmbaga12@gmail.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: bcmmbaga <bethuelmbaga12@gmail.com>
2026-04-02 18:21:00 +02:00
Viktor Liu
5bf2372c4d [management] Fix L4 service creation deadlock on single-connection databases (#5779) 2026-04-02 14:46:14 +02:00
7 changed files with 75 additions and 11 deletions

View File

@@ -221,6 +221,7 @@ func (a *Auth) getPKCEFlow(client *mgm.GrpcClient) (*PKCEAuthorizationFlow, erro
config := &PKCEAuthProviderConfig{
Audience: protoConfig.GetAudience(),
ClientID: protoConfig.GetClientID(),
ClientSecret: protoConfig.GetClientSecret(), //nolint:staticcheck
TokenEndpoint: protoConfig.GetTokenEndpoint(),
AuthorizationEndpoint: protoConfig.GetAuthorizationEndpoint(),
Scope: protoConfig.GetScope(),
@@ -265,6 +266,7 @@ func (a *Auth) getDeviceFlow(client *mgm.GrpcClient) (*DeviceAuthorizationFlow,
config := &DeviceAuthProviderConfig{
Audience: protoConfig.GetAudience(),
ClientID: protoConfig.GetClientID(),
ClientSecret: protoConfig.GetClientSecret(), //nolint:staticcheck
Domain: protoConfig.Domain,
TokenEndpoint: protoConfig.GetTokenEndpoint(),
DeviceAuthEndpoint: protoConfig.GetDeviceAuthEndpoint(),

View File

@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ var _ OAuthFlow = &DeviceAuthorizationFlow{}
type DeviceAuthProviderConfig struct {
// ClientID An IDP application client id
ClientID string
// ClientSecret An IDP application client secret
ClientSecret string
// Domain An IDP API domain
// Deprecated. Use OIDCConfigEndpoint instead
Domain string

View File

@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@ const (
type PKCEAuthProviderConfig struct {
// ClientID An IDP application client id
ClientID string
// ClientSecret An IDP application client secret
ClientSecret string
// Audience An Audience for to authorization validation
Audience string
// TokenEndpoint is the endpoint of an IDP manager where clients can obtain access token
@@ -109,7 +111,8 @@ func NewPKCEAuthorizationFlow(config PKCEAuthProviderConfig) (*PKCEAuthorization
}
cfg := &oauth2.Config{
ClientID: config.ClientID,
ClientID: config.ClientID,
ClientSecret: config.ClientSecret,
Endpoint: oauth2.Endpoint{
AuthURL: config.AuthorizationEndpoint,
TokenURL: config.TokenEndpoint,

View File

@@ -288,6 +288,8 @@ func (m *Manager) validateSubdomainRequirement(ctx context.Context, domain, clus
}
func (m *Manager) persistNewService(ctx context.Context, accountID string, svc *service.Service) error {
customPorts := m.clusterCustomPorts(ctx, svc)
return m.store.ExecuteInTransaction(ctx, func(transaction store.Store) error {
if svc.Domain != "" {
if err := m.checkDomainAvailable(ctx, transaction, svc.Domain, ""); err != nil {
@@ -295,7 +297,7 @@ func (m *Manager) persistNewService(ctx context.Context, accountID string, svc *
}
}
if err := m.ensureL4Port(ctx, transaction, svc); err != nil {
if err := m.ensureL4Port(ctx, transaction, svc, customPorts); err != nil {
return err
}
@@ -315,12 +317,23 @@ func (m *Manager) persistNewService(ctx context.Context, accountID string, svc *
})
}
// ensureL4Port auto-assigns a listen port when needed and validates cluster support.
func (m *Manager) ensureL4Port(ctx context.Context, tx store.Store, svc *service.Service) error {
// clusterCustomPorts queries whether the cluster supports custom ports.
// Must be called before entering a transaction: the underlying query uses
// the main DB handle, which deadlocks when called inside a transaction
// that already holds the connection.
func (m *Manager) clusterCustomPorts(ctx context.Context, svc *service.Service) *bool {
if !service.IsL4Protocol(svc.Mode) {
return nil
}
return m.capabilities.ClusterSupportsCustomPorts(ctx, svc.ProxyCluster)
}
// ensureL4Port auto-assigns a listen port when needed and validates cluster support.
// customPorts must be pre-computed via clusterCustomPorts before entering a transaction.
func (m *Manager) ensureL4Port(ctx context.Context, tx store.Store, svc *service.Service, customPorts *bool) error {
if !service.IsL4Protocol(svc.Mode) {
return nil
}
customPorts := m.capabilities.ClusterSupportsCustomPorts(ctx, svc.ProxyCluster)
if service.IsPortBasedProtocol(svc.Mode) && svc.ListenPort > 0 && (customPorts == nil || !*customPorts) {
if svc.Source != service.SourceEphemeral {
return status.Errorf(status.InvalidArgument, "custom ports not supported on cluster %s", svc.ProxyCluster)
@@ -404,12 +417,14 @@ func (m *Manager) assignPort(ctx context.Context, tx store.Store, cluster string
// The count and exists queries use FOR UPDATE locking to serialize concurrent creates
// for the same peer, preventing the per-peer limit from being bypassed.
func (m *Manager) persistNewEphemeralService(ctx context.Context, accountID, peerID string, svc *service.Service) error {
customPorts := m.clusterCustomPorts(ctx, svc)
return m.store.ExecuteInTransaction(ctx, func(transaction store.Store) error {
if err := m.validateEphemeralPreconditions(ctx, transaction, accountID, peerID, svc); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := m.ensureL4Port(ctx, transaction, svc); err != nil {
if err := m.ensureL4Port(ctx, transaction, svc, customPorts); err != nil {
return err
}
@@ -512,16 +527,49 @@ type serviceUpdateInfo struct {
}
func (m *Manager) persistServiceUpdate(ctx context.Context, accountID string, service *service.Service) (*serviceUpdateInfo, error) {
effectiveCluster, err := m.resolveEffectiveCluster(ctx, accountID, service)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
svcForCaps := *service
svcForCaps.ProxyCluster = effectiveCluster
customPorts := m.clusterCustomPorts(ctx, &svcForCaps)
var updateInfo serviceUpdateInfo
err := m.store.ExecuteInTransaction(ctx, func(transaction store.Store) error {
return m.executeServiceUpdate(ctx, transaction, accountID, service, &updateInfo)
err = m.store.ExecuteInTransaction(ctx, func(transaction store.Store) error {
return m.executeServiceUpdate(ctx, transaction, accountID, service, &updateInfo, customPorts)
})
return &updateInfo, err
}
func (m *Manager) executeServiceUpdate(ctx context.Context, transaction store.Store, accountID string, service *service.Service, updateInfo *serviceUpdateInfo) error {
// resolveEffectiveCluster determines the cluster that will be used after the update.
// It reads the existing service without locking and derives the new cluster if the domain changed.
func (m *Manager) resolveEffectiveCluster(ctx context.Context, accountID string, svc *service.Service) (string, error) {
existing, err := m.store.GetServiceByID(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, accountID, svc.ID)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
if existing.Domain == svc.Domain {
return existing.ProxyCluster, nil
}
if m.clusterDeriver != nil {
derived, err := m.clusterDeriver.DeriveClusterFromDomain(ctx, accountID, svc.Domain)
if err != nil {
log.WithError(err).Warnf("could not derive cluster from domain %s", svc.Domain)
} else {
return derived, nil
}
}
return existing.ProxyCluster, nil
}
func (m *Manager) executeServiceUpdate(ctx context.Context, transaction store.Store, accountID string, service *service.Service, updateInfo *serviceUpdateInfo, customPorts *bool) error {
existingService, err := transaction.GetServiceByID(ctx, store.LockingStrengthUpdate, accountID, service.ID)
if err != nil {
return err
@@ -558,7 +606,7 @@ func (m *Manager) executeServiceUpdate(ctx context.Context, transaction store.St
m.preserveListenPort(service, existingService)
updateInfo.serviceEnabledChanged = existingService.Enabled != service.Enabled
if err := m.ensureL4Port(ctx, transaction, service); err != nil {
if err := m.ensureL4Port(ctx, transaction, service, customPorts); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := m.checkPortConflict(ctx, transaction, service); err != nil {

View File

@@ -787,6 +787,11 @@ func (s *Service) validateHTTPTargets() error {
}
func (s *Service) validateL4Target(target *Target) error {
// L4 services have a single target; per-target disable is meaningless
// (use the service-level Enabled flag instead). Force it on so that
// buildPathMappings always includes the target in the proto.
target.Enabled = true
if target.Port == 0 {
return errors.New("target port is required for L4 services")
}

View File

@@ -966,6 +966,7 @@ func (s *Server) GetDeviceAuthorizationFlow(ctx context.Context, req *proto.Encr
Provider: proto.DeviceAuthorizationFlowProvider(provider),
ProviderConfig: &proto.ProviderConfig{
ClientID: s.config.DeviceAuthorizationFlow.ProviderConfig.ClientID,
ClientSecret: s.config.DeviceAuthorizationFlow.ProviderConfig.ClientSecret,
Domain: s.config.DeviceAuthorizationFlow.ProviderConfig.Domain,
Audience: s.config.DeviceAuthorizationFlow.ProviderConfig.Audience,
DeviceAuthEndpoint: s.config.DeviceAuthorizationFlow.ProviderConfig.DeviceAuthEndpoint,
@@ -1036,6 +1037,7 @@ func (s *Server) GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow(ctx context.Context, req *proto.Encryp
ProviderConfig: &proto.ProviderConfig{
Audience: s.config.PKCEAuthorizationFlow.ProviderConfig.Audience,
ClientID: s.config.PKCEAuthorizationFlow.ProviderConfig.ClientID,
ClientSecret: s.config.PKCEAuthorizationFlow.ProviderConfig.ClientSecret,
TokenEndpoint: s.config.PKCEAuthorizationFlow.ProviderConfig.TokenEndpoint,
AuthorizationEndpoint: s.config.PKCEAuthorizationFlow.ProviderConfig.AuthorizationEndpoint,
Scope: s.config.PKCEAuthorizationFlow.ProviderConfig.Scope,

View File

@@ -545,7 +545,8 @@ func Test_GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow(t *testing.T) {
expectedFlowInfo := &mgmtProto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow{
ProviderConfig: &mgmtProto.ProviderConfig{
ClientID: "client",
ClientID: "client",
ClientSecret: "secret",
},
}
@@ -568,4 +569,5 @@ func Test_GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow(t *testing.T) {
}
assert.Equal(t, expectedFlowInfo.ProviderConfig.ClientID, flowInfo.ProviderConfig.ClientID, "provider configured client ID should match")
assert.Equal(t, expectedFlowInfo.ProviderConfig.ClientSecret, flowInfo.ProviderConfig.ClientSecret, "provider configured client secret should match") //nolint:staticcheck
}